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THE WANDERING MISSOURI RIVER:
A STUDY IN ACCRETION LAW
ROBERT E. BECK*
It is a perpetual dissatisfaction with its bed that is the
greatest peculiarity of the Missouri. It is harder to suit m
the matter of beds than a traveling man. Time after time
it has gotten out of its bed m the middle of the night, with
no apparent provocation, and has hunted up a new bed, all
littered with forests, cornfields, brick houses, railroad ties,
and telegraph poles. Then it has suddenly taken a fancy
to its old bed, which by this time has been filled with
suburban architecture, and back it has gone with a whoop
and a rush, as happy as if it had really found something
worth while.
George Fitch, The Missouri River, Its Habits and
Eccentricities Described by a Personal Friend (1907) 1
Courts have repeatedly referred to the Missouri River as "that
vagrant and inconstant stream,"12 thus recognizing a characteristic
of the River which has put a heavy burden on the law of accretion.
Court results concerning questions of title to lands affected by the
river's action have been as drastic as the action itself. In 1959 the
Supreme Court of Iowa held that X, record owner of nearly 850
acres of land had lost his title thereto forever when the Missouri
completely submerged those 850 acres.2 This holding was unani-
mous even though the land was bared again with a ten year period
and readily identifiable. 4 The court reasoned that when X's land
was washed away, the land behind X's became riparian and the
850 acres when they reappeared attached to the new riparian land
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. B.S.L. LL. B., University
of Minnesota. LL.M. New York University.
1. The American Magazine, vol. 63, no. 6, April, 1907, p. 637, quoted in Maw v. Bru-
neau, 37 S.D. 75, 156 N.W. 792 (1916).
2. See, e.g., Yearsley v. Gipple, 104 Neb. 88, 175 N.W 641 (1919), East Omaha Land
Co. V. Hansen, 117 Iowa 96, 90 N.W 705, 706 (1902) ("that capricious and inconstant
stream").
3. Wilcox v. Pinney, 250 Iowa 1378, 98 N.W.2d 720 (1959), 45 IOWA L. REV. 945
(1960). "The record title to these lands snce 1855 has been in plaintiff and his predeces-
sors " Id. at 722. (Emphasis added.)
4. "The record is undisputed that this river and its bed moved over to the east of Iowa
side in the late 1920's or early 1930's, and then moved back to its former or present loca-
tion In the middle or the late 1930's." 98 N.W.2d at 723.
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as accretion. On the other hand, in 1965 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota held that the accretion which would attach to backland
that came to abut on the River through erosion of frontland was
limited to the accretion that would form within the original boundary
lines of the backland.5 Apparently the Court intended this rule to
apply even though the backland may have been abutting on the
river for 100 years6 and even though the heirs of the record owner
of the submerged land may have scattered to the four winds. So
the court records bear out in cold facts the observation of George
Fitch set out earlier. And even though the federal government is
now in the process of "stabilizing" the Missouri River channel, the
problems are not over.7  Land is now being condemned for the
Oahe Reservoir and complicated title problems are arising continu-
ally." It therefore seems appropriate to single out the Missouri
River and analyze just what problems it has caused, how they have
been met and what remain. 9 I propose to use the foregoing fact
situation from the Iowa and North Dakota cases as the focal point
of this article. I shall term the originally riparian land as "front-
land" and that land which comes to abut on the River when the
frontland is submerged as "backland." Of the seven states abutting
the Missouri River, Kansas, 10  Missouri,11  Nebraska, 12  and South
Dakota, 13 have decisions involving similar facts. The Kansas,
5. Perry v. Erling, 132 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1965), 42 N.D. L. REV. 51 (1965). See also
Beck, Boundary Litigation and Legtslation sn North Dakota, 41 N.D.L. REv. 424, 446-450
(1965).
6. The time lapse for the action of the River in this case is not clear. The court said
only "She [plaintiff] contends that sometime between 1872 and the present time the Mis-
souri River moved eastward, so that all of the intervening land and some of the Northeast
Quarter was lost by erosion, whereby the remaining portion of the Northeast Quarter of
Section 8 became riparian, and that thereafter land was built by imperceptible degrees to
the said Northeast Quarter, extending over the locations of the former intervening tracts
and some distances beyond those tracts as the river receded to the west." 132 N.W.2d at
890-91. Certainly the Court gave no indication in Perry that It considered the time element
important, nor has it done so in the two subsequent cases in which it has followed Perry.
See Woodland v.Woodland, 147 N.W.2d 590 (N.D. 1966) and Greeman v. Smith, 138 N.W.2d
433 (N.D. 1965).
7. See Underhill, Determination of Rights to Real Property Along the Missouri River
sn Connection With River Stabilization, 42 IowA L. Ruv. 58 (1956). Note that In 1964 the
Supreme Court of Nebraska still felt it proper to observe. "Channel change, accretion and
reliction, and island formation are constant and continuing processes on this alluvial Mis-
souri River plain." Krumweide v. Rose, 177 Neb. 570, 129 N.W.2d 491, 493 (1964), Sieck
v. Godsoy, 254 Iowa 624, 118 N.W.2d 555 (1962). See also, footnote 89 infra.
8. See United States v. 2,134.46 Acres of Land, 257 F Supp. 723 (D. N.D. 1966).
9. Note that one Missouri River historian has observed. "To understand the people
on the Missouri, it is first necessary to know the river itself; for it was always an active
member of the community-though not always one in good standing. The pioneers lived
with one foot in the Big Muddy and it had a profound effect upon their character, feelings,
behavior, and ideas " VESTAL, THE MISSOURI 7 (Bison Book ed. 1945).
10. Peuker v. Canter, 62 Kan. 363, 63 Pac. 617 (1901).
11. Widdecombe v. Chiles, 173 Mo. 195, 73 S.W 444 (1903), Doebbeling v. Hall, 310
Mo. 204, 274 S.W 1049 (1925), see also Erickson v. Greub, 287 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1956).
12. Yearsley v. Gipple, 104 Neb. 88, 175 N.W 641 (1919), Worm v. Crowell, 165 Neb.
713, 87 N.W.2d 384 (1958).
13. Allard v. Curran, 41 S.D. 73, 168 N.W. 761 (1918), Erickson v. Horlyk, 48 S.D. 544,
205 N.W. 613 (1925).
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Missouri and Nebraska decisions appear to agree with the Iowa
decision, while the South Dakota decisions appear to agree with the
North Dakota decision. Only Montana has made no determination
on this question.
Since this article is about accretion and, by necessity, three re-
lated concepts, it may be well to give some basic descriptions of
these concepts at this point, with the understanding that they will
be refined from time to time as the article progresses.14
(1) Accretion is generally defined as the process where the
action of water causes the gradual and imperceptible deposit
of soil in a certain place so that it becomes dry, fast land.
(2) When water gradually recedes baring land in the process
the proper descriptive term is dereliction. (3) If soil is
lost by the gradual encroachment of water the process is
generally referred to as erosion. (4) When the water
location changes suddenly as for example when a river
leaves its old bed forming an entirely new one, the inun-
dating process is referred to as avulsion and the baring
process as reliction, as contrasted with dereliction above.
Generally today, however, the entire swift change process is
referred to as avulsion, whereas reliction is used in the
situation described above where dereliction should be used.
I shall use the modern usage in this article.
The deposited and bared soil is referred to as alluvion. Generally
alluvion formed by accretion or reliction belongs to the owner of
the land against which it forms, irrespective of who owned the bed
at the time. However when avulsion occurs, ownership does not
change .1 5
Now one more thing needs to be considered in a general way
before reverting to our frontland-backland fact situation. Why does
alluvion attach to the riparian land, or, to put the question differ-
ently, why do boundaries follow the water line when accretion and
reliction are involved? Why should the result be different when
avulsion is involved? While some writers have segregated as many
as six different reasons or rationales for awarding accretion to
riparian land,16 and while all six have been referred to in connection
with the Missouri at one time or another,1 7 my own view is that
these six cannot be considered entirely independently of each other
14. These descriptions will be paraphrased from an earlier article of mine, and no fur-
ther authority will be cited at this point. See Beck, Boundary Litigation and Legrslation in
North Dakota, 41 N.D. L. REV. 424, 445 (1965), and the references cited therein.
15. See, however, the discussion at notes 77-78 snfra, re state cession of the bed as in-
demnification to those whose land has been newly inundated.
16. See, e.g., Comment on Recent Case, 45 IOWA L. REV. 935, 948-50 (1960).
17. See cases and materials cited in footnotes 18, 21, 27, 30 and 36 snfra.
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in all instances. I hope to make my reasons for this view clear
in the subsequent discussion.
Undoubtedly one of the earliest theories for awarding alluvion
to riparian land was that of analogy to accession. When a cow
produces a calf, generally the calf belongs to the owner of the cow;
when X's car is painted, the paint belongs to X. So too to the early
more formalistic mind accretion was the creation of new land and
it ought to belong to the owner of the land to which it was added.
Thus we find in the Ownership Title of the Napoleonic Code a
chapter on "As to the Right of Accession to What a Thing Produces"
and a chapter on "Of the Right of Accession in Connection with
Real Estate." '18 Accretion is dealt with in the latter chapter. But
there are at least two things wrong with analogy to accession as
an independent supporting theory First, often new land was not
being created; the water simply receded from the land in question. In
other words, the theory could explain accretion, which was the grad-
ual deposit of soil particles and thus the "creation" of new land,
but it would not explain reliction which was simply the baring of
already existing soil. To say that relicted land was also new in
the sense that it had become "newly" bared or new "dry" land
would be unsatisfactory for that argument would apply to land bared
by the avulsive process also and quite clearly land bared by the
avulsive process does not change ownership. Second, why should
the alluvion belong to the owner of the contiguous land instead of
to the owner of the bed? Was it not "acceding" or "accretmg"
or "adding" just as much to the bed as to the contiguous land?
It is now and generally has been recognized for a long time that
when land first forms as an island it belongs to the owner of the
bed and not to the owner of the near shore line;'.9 thus the principle
of accession to the bed is and has been recognized. If there can
be both accession to the shore line and accession to the bed, it
seems reasonable to conclude that there must have been something
more than simply the theory of analogy to accession that led to
preferring the riparian owner over the owner of the bed.
A second early theory was that a river is a natural boundary
and thus when the river moves the boundary moves. For example,
m 1887 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut observed:
18. See CACHARD, TEm CrvIL CODE OF FRAiNCE 134-39 (1895). A similar structure exists
today in the Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota Codes. See N.D. CENT. CODE chs.
47-06 and 47-08 (1960) S.D. CODE chs. 51.11 and 51.12 (1939), MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
chs. 67-13 and 67-14 (1947).
19. For example the Napoleonic Code provided. "Islands, islets, accretions, which are
formed in the beds of rivers or streams navigable for boats or rafts belong to the State if
there is no title or prescription to the contrary. Civ. C. 538, 2227." CACHAD, THE CIVIL
CODE OF FRANCE 1 569, at 138.
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All original lines submerged by the river have ceased to
exist; the river is itself a natural boundary, and every
changing condition of the river in relation to adjoining lands
is treated as a natural relation, and is not affected m any
manner by the relations of the river and the land at any
former period. The river boundary is treated in all
cases as a natural boundary, and the rights of the parties
as changing with the change of the bed.
20
Query if the court is saying that there is no other way to identify
the boundary, that this is the only way we will know where X's
boundary is so this must be the result? It has been so interpreted.
Thus in 1918, the Supreme Court of South Dakota stated:
This rule appears, as is indicated by some of the above-
quoted language, to have sprung from the fact that, when
the riparian estate is destroyed and carried away, the
boundary line between that and the adjacent estate is oblit-
erated and lost, and that, in case of restoration by accretion
or reliction, there is no way of identifying the original
estate, and therefore it is deemed to have been entirely
destroyed and lost. But no such reason exists in this case.
The boundary line between the lands of appellant and
respondent was a government section line, and of course
can be re-established without difficulty In the absence of
the reason, there is no justification for the rule.
21
On the other hand, there are many cases involving fixed boun-
daries which could be identified without great difficulty after a
shift in the water line that hold that the accretion doctrine applies.
2
And then the question arises, why should there be something magical
about a "natural" boundary9 And why does the boundary not
change when avulsion occurs? Is not avulsion a "natural" change
in that it is caused by the laws of nature?22 It may not be natural
if by that is meant the usual occurrence, although on the Missouri
it may even be natural in that sense of the word. Or is the boundary
easier to identify when avulsion occurs? It is easier, perhaps, in
the sense that one can tell that there has been a shift.
The age-old maxim, de mintmis non curat lex,2 is a third theory
used to sustain the awarding of alluvion to the contiguous land
owner. 2  After all, accretion is the "gradual and imperceptible"
20. Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292, 10 AtI. 565, 566-67 (1887).
21. Allard v. Curran, 41 S.D. 73, 168 N.W. 761-62 (1918).
22. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Pinney, 250 Iowa 1378, 98 N.W.2d 720 (1959) Worm v. Crow-
ell, 165 Neb. 713, 87 N.W.2d 884 (1958).
23. See the language from Farnham quoted at note 40 infra.
24. "[Tlhe law concerns not Itself about trifles," STIMsON, GLOSSARY OF THE COMMON
LAw 102 (1881).
25. This is given by Blackstone as one reason when he states: "And as to lands gained
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addition of soil; in theory there is not very much added during
any given year or even during say a ten year period, therefore it
is too little to worry about either by a court or someone other
than the riparian owner It is easiest to just give it to the con-
tiguous owner What is so clearly obvious, however, is that in a
great many cases there has been plenty to care about; thus in the
Iowa case it was roughly 850 acres. 2r As a matter of fact, some-
one other than the contiguous land owner must be caring else why
the litigation? It cannot be for vexatious purposes in all of the
many cases on the subject. This de minimLs theory could explain
the different rule for avulsive changes, in that by definition avulsion
would seem to involve more than de minims amounts of land.
A fourth theory might be termed the "productivity" theory
The law, as a matter of policy, should favor the productive use of
all lands, and the adjacent landowner is in the best position to
utilize the accreted land, so we give it to him. Or as the United
States Supreme Court put it per Mr Justice Blatchford:"[W]hether
that principle be one of public policy, in that it is the interest of
the community that all lands should have an owner, and most con-
venient that insensible additions to the shore should follow the title
to the shore. ''27 This somewhat broader formulation relates this
theory very much to the de minimis theory in its reference to
"insensible additions," and it may well be that the two are in fact
one. To put the theory on the basis that accretion is given to the
contiguous land owner as a reward for making land productive as
the House of Lords has done seems to me objectionable. That
Court reasoned this way-
Unless trodden by cattle, many years must pass away before
lands formed by alluvion would be hard enough or sufficiently
wide to be used beneficially by any one but the owner of
the lands adjoining. As soon as alluvion lands rise above
the water, the cattle from the adjoining lands will give
them consistency by treading on them; and prepare them
for grass or agriculture by the manure which they will drop
from the sea, either by alluvion, by the washing up of sand and earth, so as in time to
make terra firma, or by dereliction, as when the sea shrinks back beIow the usual water-
mark; in these cases the law is held to be, that if this gain be by little and little, by
small and imperceptible degrees, it shall go to the owner of the land adjoining. For de
minimis non curat lex " 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 262
(Lewis ed. 1897).
26. See the text at notes 3 and 4 supra. In Rupp v. Kirk, 231 Iowa 1387, 4 N.W.2d 264
(1942), some 400 acres were involved.
27. Jefferls v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 191 (1890). To the same effect is
language in an earlier opinion by Chief Justice Salmond P Chase "from the principle of
public policy, that it is the Interest of the community that all land should have an owner,
and most convenient, that insensible additions to the shore should follow the title to the
shore itself." Banks v. Ogden, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 57, 67 (1864). Mr. Justice Blatchford,
however, does not purport to be quoting Chief Justice Chase.
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on them. When they are but a yard wide the owner of the
adjoining lands may render them productive. Thus lands
which are of no use to the King will be useful to the owner
of the adjoining lands, and he will acquire a title to them
on the same principle that all titles to lands have been
acquired by individuals, viz. by occupation and improve-
ment.
Locke in a passage in his Treatise on Government, in which
he describes the grounds of the exclusive right of property,
says: 'God and man's reason commanded him to subdue
the earth; that is, improve it for the benefit of life, and
therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his
labour He that in obedience to that command subdued,
tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it
something that was his property which another had not title
to, nor could without injury take from him.'
Vi s custom is beneficial to the public. Much land which
would remain for years, perhaps for ever, barren, is in
consequence of this custom rendered productive as soon as
it is formed. 2s
Certainly there is or was no requirement that the land in fact be
made productive in any jurisdiction that I know of, either now or
in the past. It seems to me that the alluvion is given under the
productivity theory in anticipation of a hoped for result rather than
as a reward. This theory would explain the avulsive change rule
in that when there is a perceptible shift it will usually involve more
than a de minimis amount of land and therefore enough that some-
one other than the contiguous owner could put it to productive use.
Two other observations or references of the House of Lords are
also interesting. One is the reference to this practice as a "custom",
the other is the reference to this as acquisition of title by "occupa-
tion and improvement." What the House of Lords is here suggesting
is that perhaps we should distinguish between the reason for favor-
ing one party over another and the methodology for giving effect
to that reason, at least as far as the early theories are concerned.
Thus the Lords say that they favor the riparian owner over the
Crown for productivities sake; they can then award him title on
an occupation or possession theory, just, for example, as one who
occupies or possesses a wild animal may acquire a property in-
terest in it. Or, going back to accession, we could favor a riparian
owner for Blackstone's de mintmts reason and then use accession
as the theory or method for saying that the riparian owner has
acquired title. In other words, how does the riparian owner "acquire"
ownership of what he clearly did not own before it existed as dry
28. Gifford v. Yarborough, 5 Bing. 163, 165-66, 130 Eng. Rep. 1023, 1024 (1828).
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land? It is not enough to say that he ought to own it. He must
have acquired ownership somehow; how) By his occupation or
possession of it. Or because it acceded to or accreted to his land."
In this context, would "custom" be a reason or a method?
"The doctrine is one of compensation. '"30 In those succinct words
the Supreme Court of Missouri once stated a fifth theory for award-
ing alluvion to the contiguous riparian owner The United States
Supreme Court speaking through Mr Justice Swaine amplifies:
The riparian right to future alluvion is a vested right. It
is an inherent and essential attribute of the original property
The title to the increment rests in the law of nature. It
is the same with that of the owner of a tree to its fruits,
and of the owner of flocks and herds to their natural increase.
The right is a natural, not a civil one. The maxim 'qui sentit..
onus debit sentire commodum' 31  lies at its foundation.
The owner takes the chances of injury and of benefit arising
from the situation of the property If there can be a gradual
loss, he must bear it; if a gradual gain, it is his.82
The Justice you will note begins with the analogy to accession
argument discussed earlier, but then goes on to give a reason for
its application in favor of the riparian owner as against the owner
of the bed in that since a riparian owner is subject to loss by action
of the water, he ought to benefit from a gain; this is only just,
right, natural, a matter of equity, a compensation or whatever
similar term you wish to use.
Now this line of theorizing has been criticized as being circular
or begging the question, because, it is said, it assumes that there
is a risk of loss and still leaves us with the question: "Why does
there have to be a loss?"13 3  Two Justices of the North Dakota
Supreme Court said, for example, in connection with our frontland-
backland situation that since an originally nonriparian (backland)
29. At this point one might well ask: why two methods? What led to the choice of one
rather than the other
9 
Perhaps all common law Jurisdictions, if left unaffected by the civil
law, would have developed the occupation or possession method along the lines expressed
by the House of Lords in Yarborough, since occupation or possession is a favorite concept
of the common law. The civil law method, however, was accession, and this method was
imported early into certain common law Jurisdictions, in particular through the Field Code,
although much of our water law in general derives from the civil law. See Wiel, Wvaters.
Amerian Law and French Authority, 33 H v. L. REv. 133 (1919). So that accession is
the prevailing common law method today too. This appears to be the only significant de-
velopment resulting from use of the civil law in relation to accretion as contrasted with
use of the common law.
30. Sweringen v. City of St. Louis, 151 Mo. 348, 52 S.W 346 at 349 (1899).
31. Apparently the maxim originated vice versa. "Qui sentit commodum sentire debet
et onus." BROoM, LEGAL MAXimS 457 (9th ed. 1924), translated as "He who derives the
advantage ought to sustain the burden." See also STIMSON, GLOSSARY OF THE COMMON LAW
251 (1881) "[H]e who feels the advantage ought to bear the burden."
32. County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 68-69 (18'74).
33. See, e.g., 45 IOWA L. REV. 945, 950 (1960).
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owner cannot lose, his boundary line being set by government bound-
ary lines and ascertainable, he should not be able to gain.34 But
these judges and the other critics earlier referred to in turn assume
that the risk of loss which the theory is concerned with is the
risk of loss of title. I doubt that the early formulators of this theory
had in mind so much that the riparian owner would lose title as
they did that the land was subject to going under and that the
owner would thereby lose its productivity, its practical value if you
will. One need only refer back to the excerpts from the 1828 House
of Lords decision set out earlier 5 to see. that this reasoning is in
perfect harmony with the approach of earlier courts to the question
of productivity If this is the underlying reasoning then the theory
would make some sense. There could be no doubt that when the
land was under water crops could not be grown on it. Today, of
course, submerged land may have considerable value unrelated to
crop growing and in many instances it may have more value than
dry land; consider for example tidelands oil. So arguably the criti-
cism of the theory should be that it may be factually incorrect
today to say that submerging of land makes it lose its value and
not that the theory begs the question. On the other hand, the fail-
ure to change ownership when an avulsive change occurs does not
appear to comport with the productivity approach to the compensa-
tion theory since an avulsive inundating of formerly dry land does
take it out of productivity, yet no compensation is given. 5 a It does
comport with the loss of title approach.
Interestingly, while the Supreme Court of Missouri announced
in 1899 that the theory underlying awarding of alluvion to the ripar-
ian owner was one of compensation, that same court had just six
years previously quoted with approval the following from an early
Minnesota case:
'But it seems to us that the rule rests upon a much broader
principle [than de minimis or compensation], and has a
much more important purpose in view, viz. to preserve
the fundamental riparian right--on which all others depend,
and which often constitutes the principal value of the land
-- of access to the water. ' s6
Thus we have our sixth theory set forth: preservation of the right
of access to water Can there be any doubt about the fundamental
importance of access in the early days when water was being used
34. Perry v. Erling, 132 N.W.2d 889, 901-902 (N.D. 1965) (concurring opinion).
35. See text at note 28 supra.
35a. C. discussion at note 77 infra and at pages 446-47 infra.
36. Crandall v. Allen, 118 Mo. 403, 24 S.W. 172 (1893). The Minnesota case being quoted
is Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1138,1142 (1893).
437
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on an individual basis almost continually for milling, irrigation, float-
ing of logs and other navigation? Now while more courts may re-
fer to de mimmis or compensation as the proper theory than refer
to preservation of access, it is clear from an examination of court
opinions that probably every jurisdiction is in reality applying the
preservation of access theory This conclusion is gleaned not so
much from direct statements of the courts as from the method used
for apportioning alluvion as between different riparian owners.
While variations and special exceptions exist, the general rule is as
set forth by the North Dakota Supreme Court:
'I. Measure the ancient bank and compute the number
of feet owned by each proprietor 2. Divide the new bank
into as many equal parts as there were feet in the old
bank and draw lines from the old points of division to the
new ones.' The application of this rule appears to
us to be practical and sensible.3 7
Note well that this rule is concerned with preserving the relative
proportion of water frontage or access and is not at all concerned
with the acreage involved. If the true basis for awarding alluvion
to riparian land was compensation for risk of loss of land, it seems
to me that a major concern in apportionment should be the acreage
involved and not just the amount of shoreline. Some courts do make
the reason for the apportionment rule explicit: "The main object
pursued in all cases is to secure to each riparian owner as nearly
as possible his former means of access to the stream. ' 3 8 In a 1964
Missouri River accretion case the Supreme Court of Nebraska noted:
Defendants argue for an extension of the section line
boundaries and an equal division of accretion acreage. They
complain of the fact that the plaintiff acquires a total of
403 accretion acres since the time of the original 1863 survey
and the defendants are left with only 137 acres. There
are many rules for the division of land accreting to a
shoreline. But, one basic principle is that no regard is
necessarily to be paid to the direction of preexisting side
37. Jennings v. Shipp, 115 N.W.2d 12, 16 (N.D. 1962). See also Doebbling v. Hall, 310
Mo. 204, 274 S.W 1049 (1925), and the cases cited in note 38 snfra.
38. Stark v. Meriwether, 98 Kan. 10, 157 Pac. 438,442 (1916), aff'd. on rehearing 99
Kan. 650, 163 Pac. 152 (1917). See also Gorton v. Rice, 153 Mo. 676, 55 S.W 241 (1900) ,
Osgood-Lewis-Perkms, Inc. v. Green, 178 Neb. 807, 135 N.W.2d 718, modified on rehearing,
179 Neb. 133, 137 N.W.2d 241 (1965) Conkey v. Knudsen, 143 Neb. 5, 8 N.W.2d 538
(1943) , Feight v. Hansen, 131 N.W.2d 64, 68 (S.D. 1964). (This case had been before the
Court earlier in Kapp v. Hansen, 79 S.D. 279, 111 N.W.2d 333 (1961), and had been re-
manded for joinder of additional parties so that apportionment could be made). Of. Gard-
ner v. Green, 67 N.D. 268, 284, 271 N.W 775, 783 (1937) where the court cites 3 IPAIN
-
HAM, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs at 2475 to the effect that the division "shall be propor-
tional so as to give each shore owner a fair share of the land to be divided and his due
portion of the new shore line. " (Emphasis added).
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lines between contiguous proprietors, the reference is ordi-
narily entirely to the shoreline.89
Why else, but for the fact that access is the most important thing,
should the rule for apportioning alluvion as between different ripar-
ian owners be based entirely on the amount of shoreline originally
owned? Now, the rule regarding avulsive change seems to comport
least well with this line of theorizing about accretion. For little is
clearer than that an avulsive change can turn riparian land into
non-riparian land very easily So if access is all that important
why is not some provision made for this in avulsive situations? Or
is the avulsion rule simply an attempt at an equitable balance?
Farnham, who supports the access to water theory, gives as an
answer that "when, by an act of nature, the riparian contact has
been destroyed, the riparian owner cannot insist upon having it
re-established at the expense of third persons who have obtained
rights by the same act."' 0 But pretty much everything that we
are dealing with here is an act of nature, so I do not see how this
retort gets us very far.
Having outlined these six theories, there remains only one more
observation to make at this point concerning the rationale behind
the accretion doctrine. A question will suffice: Is it, has it been,
or ought it to be, of significance that in these early cases, which
evolved the basic accretion doctrine as an existing part of the com-
mon law, the controversy was between the State (Crown) and a
private individual, rather than between two private mdividuals?41
Now, how does the Missouri River relate to the law of accretion?
What has been its experience? The Missouri runs through or borders
upon seven states.4 2 With the exception of Montana they have all
had significant and generally substantial litigation involving the
River, the seven state total being well over 100 cases dealing with
accretion or related problems thereon. An important initial ques-
tion was whether or not the law of accretion should be applied to
the Missouri River at all because of its "vagrant and inconstant"
character or to use the milder words of the North Dakota Supreme
39. Swanson v. Dalton, 178 Neb. 55, 131 N.W.2d 704, 708 (1964).
40. 1 FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 328 (1904).
41. See the discussion at note 102 infra.
42. Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota. Since
the Missouri forms the boundary line between several of the states, the question has often
risen whether the land is in one state or the other. See, e.g., Tyson v. State of Iowa, 283
F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1960) East Omaha Land Co. v. Hansen, 117 Iowa 76, 90 N.W 705
(1902) , Coulthard v. McIntosh, 143 Iowa 389, 122 N.W 233 (1909) , Kitteridge v. Ritter,
172 Iowa 55, 151 N.W 1097 (1915). Here the court went so far as to apply a presump-
tion. "The land, being concededly on the east side of the Missouri River, is presumed to
be in Iowa." 151 N.W at 1098. Bigelow v. Herrink, 200 Iowa 830, 205 N.W 531 (1925)
Rober V. Michelson, 82 Neb. 48, 116 N.W 949 (1908), O'Connor v. Petty, 96 Neb. 727, 146
N.W 947 (1914).
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Court because it "has characteristically been known to undulate in
varying degrees. ' 4 3  Since a requirement for the accretion doc-
trine to apply was that it take place gradually and "imperceptibly,"
the argument was that this could not occur on the quick-changing
Missouri. Furthermore some measure of "permanence" was re-
quired: "A merely temporary recession of water or lodgment of
accretion against a bank will not establish a new boundary nor
effect a change of title."44
The early state cases which considered this question in Missouri,
4 5
Nebraska,4 6 and Kansas 47 relied almost entirely on the fact that
the United States Supreme Court had said in 189048 that the doctrine
should apply to the Missouri and had reaffirmed this view in 1892.41
The 1890 opinion posed the issue this way-
It is contended by the defendant that this well-settled rule
is not applicable to land which borders on the Missouri River,
because of the peculiar character of that stream and of
the soil through which it flows, the course of the river being
tortuous, the current rapid, and the soil a soft, sandy loam,
not protected from the action of water either by rocks or
the roots of trees; the effect being that the river cuts away
its banks, sometimes in a large body, and makes for itself
a new course, while the earth thus removed is almost
simultaneously deposited elsewhere, and new land is formed
almost as rapidly as the former bank was carried away 50
In part the Court's answer was that it had already decided that
the rules on accretion were applicable to the Mississippi River "and,
that being so, although the changes on the Missouri River are
greater and more rapid than on the Mississippi, the difference does
not constitute such a difference in principle as to render inapplicable
to the Missouri River the general rule of law "51 But the Court
43. Jennings v. Shipp, 115 N.W.2d 12,13 (N.D. 1962).
44. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 856-57, note 1, at page 857.
45. Cooley v. Golden, 117 Mo. 33, 23 S.W. 100 (1893), citing Jefferis v. East Omaha
Land Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890) and Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1892). In the same
opinion, however, the Court did reject the common law test for navigability* "It is very
manifest that the principle of the common law, as said by Chancellor Walworth, 'is not
sufficiently broad to embrace our large' western rivers." Id. at 104.
46. DeLong v. Olsen, 63 Neb. 527, 88 N.W. 512 (1901). Referring to Nebraska v. Iowa,
143 U.S. 359 (1892), the court said. "[T]his case is controlled by the conclusions there
announced. " 88 N.W at 514.
47. Fowler v. Wood, 73 Kan. 511, 85 Pac. 763 (1906), citing Missouri v. Nebraska, 196
U.S. 23 (1904), and Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1892), and Wood !v. McAlpme, 85
Kan. 657, 118 Pac. 1060, 1062 (1911), aff'd on rehearng 86 Kan. 804, 121 Pac. 916
(1912), citing the same two cases.
48. Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178 (1890).
49. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1892). See also Missouri v. Nebraska, 196 U.S. 23
(1904) for further affirmance of that position. The question appears to have been present-
ed much later in Iowa. See Solomon v. Sioux City, 243 Iowa 634, 51 N.W.2d 472, 475-76
(1952).
50. Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 189 (1890).
51. Id. at 190.
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went further and seized the bull by the horns: "The very fact of
the great changes in result, caused by imperceptible accretion, m
the case of the Missouri River, makes even more imperative the
application to that river of the law of accretion.
'52
Note well, however, that the Court still referred to it as "imper-
ceptible." The Court was most emphatic in making it clear that
"imperceptible" meant only that the addition of accreted land must
be imperceptible as it formed and that it did not matter if it was
"discernible by comparison at two distinct points of time."' 5 The
Court noted that in the leading English case54 the accreted land
accumulated to 450 acres "in a short time" and that in an earlier
case involving the Mississippi River they had applied the doctrine
where "the accretion was 140 feet in width, formed in 22 years." 55
In the 1890 case the river movement had "begun in 1853 and con-
tinued until 1870, resulting in the production by accretion of the
tract of 40 acres and more. "56 The application of the accretion
rule in six of the Missouri River states seems to be in accord with
these United States Supreme Court decisions. Thus, for example,
the Supreme Court of Iowa applied the doctrine to a 300 foot tract
of land which had formed in three years or at the rate of 100 feet
per year 57 The Kansas court found accretion where: "[T]he Kan-
sas shoreline was thereby extended for a distance of about two
miles, during a period of 50 years. ,,8 The Supreme Court of
Missouri has noted: "the recession of the waters from the old eastern
most channel of the Missouri [R]iver was gradual and impercep-
tible, extending over a period of at least two years or more.. ,59
In Nebraska the doctrine has been applied where substantial move-
ment occurred in a one year period.60 The North Dakota Supreme
Court has applied the doctrine to a 240 rod movement which oc-
curred during a maximum of 38 years, from 1899 to 1938.61 The
52. Id. at 191. The Supreme Court of Nebraska has made the following interesting ob-
servation. "Along the Missouri river the change of the bed to dry land in the case of
accretion is sometimes even more rapidly performed than the changes of the abandoned
bed to dry land in the case of avulsion, for in such case the abandoned bed is usuily full
of water, which gradually evaporates and which In many instances forms lakes which
stand for years, occasionally filled again by the river in flood periods, a number of these
'cut-off lakes,' as they are locally termed, extending from three to eight or ten miles long
and occupying practically the whole of the abandoned bed for many years." Kinkead v.
Targeon, 74 Neb. 580, 109 N.W 744, 747 (1906).
53. 14. at 193.
54. The court was referring to Gifford v. Yarborough supra note 28.
55. 134 U.S. at 193, referring to New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662
(1836).
56. 134 U.S. at 191-92.
57. Solomon v. Sioux City, 243 Iowa 634, 51 N.W.2d 472 (1952).
58. McBride v. Steinweden, 72 Kan. 508, 83 Pac. 822, 824 (1906).
59. Cullen v. Johnson, 325 Mo. 253, 29 S.W.2d 39, 47 (1930).
60. Conkey V. Knudsen, 143 Neb. 5, 8 N.W.2d 538 (1943).
61. Oberly v. Carpenter, 67 N.D. 495, 274 N.W 509 (1937). See also Jennings v. Shipp,
115 N.W.2d 12, 13 (N.D. 1962), where the Court observed: "over a period of approximately
forty years, either by the recession of the stream or by the accumulation of various ma-
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situation in South Dakota is not quite as clear.02  On the other
hand, language in a Montana opinion, although not dealing with
the Missouri River, does suggest a contrary interpretation of "im-
perceptible"
In less than 100 years the river here has moved approxi-
mately a quarter of a mile from the SW % of Section 8 into
the NE 1 of Section 18. This is substantial movement and
is perceptible over the period of just one generation. Even
without the clear evidence of a sudden flood we would be
inclined to label this migration 'perceptible' and, therefore,
avulsive. s3
Undoubtedly this is dicta, but it may well be more in line with the
early history of the doctrine than the cases in the other six states,
since in the early history of the doctrine problems similar to those
of the quick-changing Missouri did not arise frequently if at all.
It does not, however, seem to comport well with any of the
rationales given for the rule. The United States Supreme Court's
observation about the rapidity of change being a greater reason for
applicability of accretion law to the Missouri suggests to me a con-
cern about access to water more than it suggests a concern about
any of the other theories.
But even though this rapid action is classified as accretion, we
still have many cases holding that certain occurrences on the
Missouri River were avulsive,64 and many more cases in which
avulsion arguments were presented although ultimately rejected.
6 5
How then do we tell whether we are dealing with accretion, relic-
tion and erosion on the one hand or avulsion on the other9 "It is
of necessity difficult, if not impossible, to fix the dividing line be-
tween avulsion and erosion. Suddenness, visibility, rapidity, violence,
quantity, and unusualness mark the one, as their absence marks
the other."6 6 So too it can be difficult to distinguish between ac-
cretion and avulsion. Just how difficult it can be is demonstrated
well by Conkey v Knudsen6 7 where in 1942 the Supreme Court of
terials, an accreted area has developed to where the river now is approximately 1536 feet
from the original meander line, leaving a substantial tract of land between the meander
line and the present water line."
62. Compare Feight v. Hansen, 131 N.W.2d 64, 65 (S.D. 1964), where the river began
receding sometime after the original survey in 1861 until there was accretion "substantially
in excess of one mile" by trial, with Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W 821 (1937)
(Rush Lake), and Anderson v. Ray, 37 S.D. 17, 156 N.W 591 (1916) (Red Lake), in each
of which the Court found no reliction.
63. McCafferty v. Young, 144 Mont. 385, 397 P.2d 96, 100 (1964) (Sun River).
64. For two leading cases see Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1892), and Fowler v.
Wood, 73 Kan. 511, 85 Pac. 763 (1906).
65. See, e.g., Conkey v. Knudsen, 143 Neb. 5, 8 N.W.2d 538 (1943) Oberly v. Carpen-
ter, 67 N.D. 495, 274 N.W 509 (1937).
66. Wood v. McAlpine, 85 Kan. 657, 118 Pac. 1060, 1065 (1911).
67. 141 Neb. 517, 4 N.W.2d 290 (1942), vacated on rehearing 143 Neb. 5, 8 N.W.2d 538
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Nebraska held that there had been avulsion but reversed itself on
rehearing in 1943 with a holding that there had been accretion.
The 1942 opinion had stated positively- "The cause of the change of
this river channel was definite and certain, and due to an ice gorge
created by a spring flood. The change thus effected thereby was
not gradual and imperceptible, but definite, sudden and certain as
to time and extent. ' 16  In the 1943 reversal the court admitted that
the movement had taken place within a year period and simply
quoted an earlier case to the effect that accretion is sometimes a
bit more rapid on the Missouri than on other bodies of water.69
Perhaps the clearest understanding of the scope of the defini-
tional difficulty, however, will come from a discussion of the dif-
ference between erosion and avulsion. In 1911 in Wood v MeAl-
pine,70 the Supreme Court of Kansas went into a thorough discussion
(1943). See 135 Neb. 890, 284 N.W 737 (1939) for earlier litigation. See also State ex rel
Conkey v. Ryan, 136 Neb. 334, 285 N.W 923 (1939) where the question of possession pend-
ing determination of title was decided. Some difficulties in definition are just plain errors.
Thus an 1892 Iowa case misquotes the Missouri Supreme Court as saying " 'The terms
"alluvion" on the one hand, and "gradual" and "imperceptible" accretion on the other, are
used by writers to contradistinguish a sudden disruption of 'a piece of ground from one
man's land to another which may be followed and identified, from that increment which
slowly or rapidly results from floods, but which is utterly beyond the power of identifica-
tion.' " Coulthard v. Stelvens, 84 Iowa 241, 50 N.W 983. 984 (1892). The Missouri Court did
not use the word "alluvion", it used the word "avulsion." Benson v. Morrow, 61 Mo. 345,
352 (1875).
68. 4 N.W.2d at 301. The Court had amplified. "Indeed, this case turns upon a disputed
question of fact. However, a careful consideration of the evidence as an entirety convinces
us beyond a reasonable doubt that this change was wholly caused by the formation of an
ice gorge In the vicinity of Cisco Point during a season of high waters in the early spring
of 1910 in the main or navigable channel The result of this gorge was to substantial-
ly block and dam the orginal channel and to force the waters carried by the same to cut
a new channel northerly and easterly for more than a mile, which waters then turned
southerly and easterly and continued until they intersected the original channel of the
Missouri River as it was then situated. As a result, when the freshet was over and the
flood waters receded In the spring of 1910 to the ordinary stages of the river, the general
situation of the main or navigable channel of the Missouri river w~as then flowing in a
new channel At ordinary stages of the river the evidence fails to show that it ever
returned to the main or navigable channel occupied in 1909. Really the evidence on this
point is without substantial contradiction." 4 N.W.2d at 295-96.
69. "The evidence shows that In the early spring of 1910 an ice gorge formed a short
distance north of the north line of section 13, causing the river to completely cover the
area east of the high bank. When the river receded it followed a course farther east of the
high bank. This changing of the course of the stream is the basis upon which we determin-
ed in our former opinion that the area was the result of an avulsion. The record does not
disclose from what land, if any, the area was cut off by avulsion, or the situation existing
from which it might be reasonably inferred that it could be identified as the same land
that had washed away from some other surveyed tract or plot marked out on the ground.
Whether the river returned to an old channel or carved out a new one is not shown. No
persons have appeared claiming ownership on the theory that an avulsion occurred in the
spring of 1910. There is evidence that after the high water of 1910 said lands were con-
nected to the high bank by additional alluvial deposits. The testimony of all the witnesses
familiar with the country is that the alluvial soil was accretive land
"We are convinced from a careful reading of the record that a finding that an avul-
sion occurred cannot be sustained and that all the facts and circumstances shown substan-
tiate the finding of the trial court that the alluvial area in question was in fact accretive
lands belonging to the high bank owners." 8 N.W.2d at 541-42. The Judges were unlanimous
In each opinion, although, apparently due to retirement, two of the seven Justices from the
first opinion did not participate in the second opinion, one of the two being the writer of
the first opinion.
70. 85 Kan. 657, 118 Pac. 1060 (1911).
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of the nature of avulsion. The court first quoted two definitions of
avulsion, one that it is "the removal of a considerable quantity
of soil from the land of one man, and its deposit upon or annex-
ation to the land of another, suddenly and by the perceptible action
of water ,," The second was that "avulsion is the suddeln and
rapid change of the channel of a stream which is a boundary, where-
by it abandons its old and seeks a new bed. '" 7 2 The court con-
tinued: "Thus we have two distinct ideas; that of bodily tearing a
piece of land away from one owner, and adding it to the land of
another, so that it can be identified; and that of a sudden and
violent change in the channel of a river, regardless of what be-
comes of the land washed away "73 After analysis, the court con-
cluded:
The authorities already referred to appear to consider
avulsion apart from the fact that the land, after its removal,
is carried away intact, or dissolved by the water, and to
determine the question by the manner of its separation from
the adjacent land. Indeed, the older rule found in some of
the cited cases could not be applied to the banks of the
Missouri, as it probably never happens that a substantial
portion of the bank is carried bodily to another place, so
as to be susceptible of identification. But we have seen that
the avulsion doctrine is and has been applied to this stream;
and hence it must be on the basis of sudden and violent
wresting, degradation, or destruction of the bank, and not
on the basis of its subsequent removal intact.
74
Now it does not appear that all of the Missouri River cases
recognize this complexity in defining avulsion or that while accretion
occurs on one side of the River there may be avulsion rather
than erosion on the other side. Thus in a North Dakota case we
find the court saying:
It is true there is testimony to the effect that when the
river was in flood the rate of cutting where the current
struck the bank was relatively rapid and that at times
when this was taking place portions of the bank might be
seen, when undermined, to fall into the river But it also
71. Id. at 1062, quoting Bouvier.
72. Ibid., quoting 29 Cyc. 349.
73. 118 Pac. at 1062. Frequently it is unclear whether one or the other or both idea"
are being expressed in a particular definition. Consider for example the following from
Independent Stock Farm v. Stevens, 128 Neb. 619, 259 N.W 647, 648 (1935) "The Mis-
souri River often changes its course by avulsion, as it did in 1894. This means that, sud-
denly, or by violent action of the elements, it leaves Its old channel and creates a new one.
In such cases the original thread of the stream continues to mark the limits of the two
estates, and land which is so cut off can be followed and identified, and its title remains
in the original owner."
74. 118 Pac. at 1064.
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appears that the material thus taken by the river was dis-
solved and washed away and was not at any later time
susceptible of identification. And, on the other hand, the new
land which was formed was formed slowly and impercep-
tibly, that is, its formation could not be seen at any particular
moment and could only be noted after the lapse of some
time.
75
Is the court saying that there was erosion rather than avulsion (1)
because you could not trace the material to a later deposit and/or
(2) because there was accretion or reliction going on on the other
side of the River> It would seem helpful, therefore, at this point
to give a diagrammatical summary of the principal or basic rules
concerning avulsion. Two illustrations followed by a brief discussion
should serve this purpose:
,-"" A "\
Illustration I Illustration II
With reference to Illustration I, we should distinguish three happen-
ings; with reference to Illustration II we should distinguish two
happenings. First with reference to Illustration I, where "A" rep-
resents the old channel and "C" represents the new channel we can
have situation (1) where when the neck is cut off in an avulsive
change the old bed "A" goes dry immediately, situation (2) where
when the neck is cut, the river simply continues flowing in bed
"A" so that we now have two channels and situation (3) where when
the neck is cut off in an avulsive change the old bed "A" remains
as a lake or gradually dries up over a period of years. In situation
(1), tract "A" remains in state ownership except m Nebraska,76
unless the state has ceded its rights thereto. North Dakota, for
example, has a statute which provides:
If a stream, navigable or not navigable, forms a new course
abandoning its ancient bed, the owners of the land newly
occupied take by way of indemnity the ancient bed aban-
75. Oberly v. Carpenter, 67 N.D. 495, 274 N.W 509, 613 (1937).
76. The State of Nebraska has never owned the bed. See cases cited in note 157 infra.
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doned, each in proportion to the land of which he has been
deprived.
77
This statute seems to say that the owners of tract "C" will take
tract "A" in proportionate shares. Since avulsion is not supposed
to result m loss of title to submerged land the owners of tract
"C" should still retain title to tract "C", subject to the right of
the government to regulate navigation thereon. 78 Ownership of tract
"B" would also continue the same.
In situation (2) ownership of all three tracts would remain as
it originally existed. The North Dakota statute just set forth
would not be applicable since here the old bed has not been
"abandoned." But we do have a relevant North Dakota statute:
If a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, in forming
itself a new arm divides itself and surrounds land belonging
to the owner of the shore and thereby forms an island, the
island belongs to such owner.79
In situation (3) we should have the same result concerning
tracts "B" and "C", retention of ownership by the original owners.
But the situation concerning tract "A" presents more of a problem.
Would the above statute awarding the bed to the owners of tract
"C" apply? The old bed has been "abandoned" as a river bed,
and there is a new bed so that seemingly under a literal interpre-
tation title to tract "A" should go to the owners of tract "C" in
proportionate shares. Arguably, however, the intent behind this
77. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-07 (1960). For the similar South Dakota statute see S.D.
CODE § 51.1106 (1939).
78. The following quote from Fowler v. Wood, 73 Kan. 511, 85 Pac. 763, 767, 768, 769,
770 (1906). bears this out.
But, if, from storm or flood or other known violent natural cause, there
be a sudden, visible irruption of the water, whereby the lands upon one
side are degraded or submerged or a new channel is cut from the stream,
the boundary remains stationary at its former location, and the boundaries
of riparian owners whose lands have been affected remain unchanged
'[The subject does not lose his property; and accordingly it was
held by Cooke and Foster, M. though the inundation continued 40
years. [quoting, HARGRAv 's LAW TRACTS, 36, 37] 'No lapse of time
during which the submergence has continued bars the right of the owner
to enter upon the land reclaimed and assert his proprietorship when the
identity can be established by reasonable marks, or by situation, extent
of quantity or boundary on the firm land. [quoting, Mulry v. Norton,
100 N.Y. 424, 3 N.E. 581] If, through some catastrophe, the river
makes its bed upon private land, the burden should fall as lightly upon
the private owner as possible. It is sufficient for the state that control
be retained over the stream for preservation of its highway character.
More than this the state ought not to take.
79. N.D.CENT. CODE § 47-06-10 (1960). For the identical South Dakota statute see S.D.
CODE § 51.1109 (1939). For the identical Montana statute see MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
67-1306 (1947). Montana does not appear to have a provision similar to that set out in the
text at note 77 supra. Arguably, these statutes exist only for the purpose of making clear
the inapplicability of the statute set forth at note 144 infra.
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statute was to give new productive land for land lost from pro-
ductivity Giving the owners of tract "C" title to the bed of a
lake would not help as far as productivity is concerned. Anyway
if and when the lake gradually dries up, through the relictive pro-
cess, title should go to the abutting owners. In other words, there
was avulsion as far as the creation of the new bed was concerned,
but there was only reliction as far as abandoning of the old bed
was concerned. Both aspects of the river bed change do not have
to be labeled avulsive! Thus we wind up with two independent
questions: (1) -At what pace did the water form the new bed?
(2) At what pace did the water leave the old bed?
Illustration II presents an avulsion problem m only two parts.
In situation (1) the tract labeled "D" is washed away rapidly and
is identifiable as a tract that has lodged somewhere downstream.
The old site is now under water In situation (2) tract "D" is washed
away rapidly but the turbulence of the river causes it to totally
disintegrate. The old site is now under water. With the occurrence
of situation (1) the tract as lodged downstream should continue to
belong to the person who lost it. This may be subject, however,
to his taking certain action within a reasonable time period. Again,
North Dakota has a relevant statute:
If a river or stream, navigable or not navigable, carries
away-by sudden violence a considerable and distinguishable
part of a bank and bears it to the opposite bank or to
another part of the same bank, the owner of the part carried
away may reclaim it within a year after the owner of the
land to which it has been united takes possession thereof.8 0
And since ownership is not supposed to change when avulsion occurs
the ownership of the submerged bed at site "D" should continue in
its original owner.8 ' In situation (2) where the land is not trace-
able the process if rapid enough should still be considered avulsive.
Ownership of the soil that has disintegrated would certainly be gone,
but ownership of the bed would be retained by the person who
originally owned it,82 assuming of course that it is identifiable.
With avulsion, accretion, reliction and erosion all taking place
on the Missouri and with differing consequences, how might one go
80. N.D. CENT. CODE §47-06-06 (1960). For the identical South Dakota statute see
S.D. CODE § 51.1105 (1939). For the identical Montana statute see MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 67-1303 (1947).
81. See note 78 supra.
82. There is contrary authority to the effect that title to the bed may be lost simply
by the length of submergence or the method of its reappearance. See, for example,
the discussion of the Iowa law at notes 114-116 infra., and the Missouri case at notes 133-
134 infra. These seem to me to be wrong in theory, although they may be reaching a de-
sireable result Query if the courts were aware of this aspect of their decisions.
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about proving that one rather than another has taken place? At least
four categories concerning evidence or proof can be established.
(1) Eye-witness testimony as to the rapidity of the action.88 Have
people observed what sort of changes have taken place on the river 9
The absence of such testimony on the part of those claiming avul-
sion may cause a court to have substantial doubt: if it was that
rapid, that rare an occurence, surely someone must have seen it.s
(2) Soil composition and other geological data. Soil formations may
be different if recently formed by accretion than if simply cut off
from other dry land. 5 (3) Size and kind of vegetation.8 8  A number
of cases appear to have been decided simply on the basis of evidence
83. See Wilcox v. Pinney, 250 Iowa 1378, 98 N.W.2d 720 (1959), Rand v. Miller, 250
Iowa 699, 95 N.W.2d 916 (1959) Bigelow (v. Herrink, 200 Iowa 830, 205 N.W 531-33
(1925) Coulthard v. Davis, 101 Iowa 625, 70 N.W 716 (1897), Oberly v. Carpenter, 67
N.D. 495, 274 N.W 509, 510-11 (1937).
84. "A sudden change of the course of the Missouri river, affecting 600 or more acres
of land, would, we think, attract considerable attention. It is altogether likely it would
have been known by everybody living m that territory, for miles around. With the dili-
gence of research displayed in the preparation for the trial of this case, some of these wit-
nesses would undoubtedly have been found, to corroborate the testimony of Homan. His
own story, as it is set up in the record, is far from being clear or convincing." Bone v.
May, 208 Iowa 1094, 225 N.W 367, 368 (1929).
85. "The whole of this tract in dispute is rough and humpy. There are sandy knolls and
ridges, and depressions. Some of the tract shows a relatively good soil but the greater
part of it is sandy. The better soil is near to the old bank. The sandier portions are nearer
the present bank, and the closer they lie to the river the sandier they are." Oberly v. Car-
penter, 67 N.D. 495, 274 N.W 509. 511 (1937). The foregoing is a part of the evidence which
the court recites and after which it says: "On the record we can come to no other conclu-
sion than that at which the trial court arrived," that conclusion being accretion. Ibid. "It
also appears that a large part of the land Is good, tillable land. The soil on the Davis
farm is blacker than the rest. It is not likely, if this land in controversy formed grad-
ually since the yeax 1868, or even since an earlier period, that it would be the character
it now is. We should in such case expect to find the soil poor, mostly sand. " Coulthard
v. Davis, 101 Iowa 625, 70 N.W. 716, 717 (1897).
86. "In the instant case the weight of the evidence indicates that there has been a
gradual accretion of land to that of the plaintiff, beginning shortly after the avulsion of
1894 and amounting to a very considerable tract of land. Upon this made land, willows
and cottonwoods took foot and grew, and in time grasses were found there, making it
useful for pasture, however, very little of It is yet adapted to farming." Independent Stock
Farm v. Stevens, 128 Neb. 196, 259 N.W. 647, 649 (1935). See also, Maw v. Bruneau, 37
S.D. 75, 156 N.W 792, 794 (1916), where because of ash trees "16 to 18 years of age"
growing from stumps that had been trees "from 40 to 50 years old at the time they were
cut down" the court reversed and held that a part of the land had never washed away
and so was not accretion to someone elses' land. "It is contended by respondent that these
stumps from which the present growing sprouts originated were washed out and carried
down from some other place upstream, and were lodged and deposited at the place where
now found by the action and currents of the waters of the stream. While such a thing
might occasionally happen, still it is hardly within the range of reasonable possibility that
some 50 or more instances of such transplanting of stumps in vertical, upright, natural
positions would occur on so small an area of land." In Coulthard v. Davis, 101 Iowa 625,
70 N.W 716, 717 (1897), the court stated. "We are of the opinion that this large body of
land, which was originally west of the Missouri river, was separated from the mainland
by reason of a sudden change in the channel of the river, whereby said channel was made
more than a mile west of Its location in 1856, when the government survey was made. Cot-
tonwood trees, some of them 15 inches In diameter, and one 2 feet In diameter, are growing
on this tract of land. Now, It is shown by the evidence that it takes 13 years for a cot-
tonwood to reach a diameter of 1 foot, and about 20 years to reach a diameter of two
feet. If this is true, then this one tree must have been growing on this land as early as
1867. It also appears that there was a grove on a part of the land. It is not likely,
If this land In controversy formed gradually since the year 1868, or even since an earlier
period, that It would be of the character it now is. [N]or would It be reasonable to
expect to find trees of the size of some of those testified to."
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as to the size of trees growing thereon. (4) Presumptions. A
number of courts have accepted a rebuttable presumption in favor
of accretion."8
While considering the evidentlary problem, it might be well to
raise the question of how man-made activity on the river affects
the doctrine of accretion. This is particularly apropos with all of
the recent stabilization work that has been done on the Missouri
River 89 There are court decisions which restrict accretion to being
a "natural" process.90 But to the Missouri River courts which have
had to specifically rule on this question the fact that alluvion has
formed because of artificial barriers such as levees, dams, dikes or
rip-rap has been irrelevant unless the riparian owner involved
has been primarily responsible for its creation.91 A federal court
87. "We think the evidence showing the age of trees lying between the former chan-
nel and the new channel precludes any conclusion that the lateral migration of the river
was slow and imperceptible." McCafferty v. Young, 144 Mont. 385, 397 P.2d 96, 99 (1964),
a case dealing with the Sun River, however. See Iowa R.R. Land Co. v. Coulthard, 96 Neb.
607, 148 N.W 328 (1914) (large trees so must be avulsion), and Maw v. Bruneau, supra
note 86.
88. Kitteridge v. Ritter, 172 Iowa 55, 151 N.W 1097 (1915) (evidence not only failed
to overcome the presumption, but actually supported it) , Bone v. May, 208 Iowa 1094, 225
N.W 367 (1929), " there is no evidence in this record, except the stipulation, to indi-
cate by what means the river changed its channel from the 1888 location as shown in our
sketch to the 1899 location. Generally there is a presumption that a change in a river's
course is by accretion rather than by avulsion. [citations omitted] In view of the total
absence of direct evidence as to the manner by which the river changed its channel, we
reject the stipulation made by the parties that an avulsive change occurred." Woodland v.
Woodland, 147 N.W.2d 590, 600, (N.D. 1966). Note, however, that the issue here was Jur-
isdictional, for if the change was avulsive it would deprive the lower court of jurisdiction.
89. "Since the United States Government acted to harness and control this river, its lo-
cation has been gradually stabilized so that a wandering of its bed hereafter seems un-
likely." Wilcox v. Pinney, 250 Iowa 1378, 98 N.W.2d 720, 725 (1959). See also Tyson v.
State of Iowa, 283 F.2d 802, (8th Cir. 1960) which involved a condemnation action "for
the purpose of stabilizing the channel of the Missouri River." And in Dartmouth College v.
Rose, 133 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Iowa 1965), we find "The exhibits clearly show the restless
Missouri River was true to form in this area from the 1920's until its channel was sta-
bilized in its present location by the efforts of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. It had
wandered east and west through the area involved. Its channel or channels often changed.
In the late 1930's some exhibits show three channels. One west, one east and another
through part of the area. The latter was the result of the engineers' efforts but it again
changed in the early 1940's after the corps' work was interrupted during the war.
After the war the work of the corps of engineers was resumed. Before plaintiff
started this case in 1960 the river had been brought under control." As to the stabilization
of "Squaw Bend" m Kansas, see Green v. Ector, 187 Kan. 240, 356 P.2d 664 (1960). See also
Krumweide v. Rose, 177 Neb. 570, 129 N.W.2d 491 (1964), concerning the Omi Island area.
See United States v. 2, 134.46 Acres of Land, 257 F Supp. 723 (D.N.D. 1966), regarding
the present federal Oahe Dam project. And see Rand v. Miller, 250 Iowa 699, 95 N.W.2d
916, 918 (1959), for a description of the attempts to stabilize DeSoto Bend "Here, as
elsewhere the Army Engineers have made determined efforts to control it, but the
great river does not surrender easily, and the attempts have not been entirely successful."
See also the references in footnote 7 supra.
90. 2 PATTON, LAND TITLES 58 (2d ed. 1957). See the cases cited therein at note 60. Two
methods of artificially acquiring title to "bed land" are statutory reclamation and the com-
mon law doctrine of "wharfing-out" See 3 AMERIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY 873-75.
91. "Apparently the question of title by the riparian owner to accreted land, built by
artificial means over which he had no control, has not been decided by this Court
In an exhaustive annotation in 134 A.L.R. 467 (1941), dealing with riparian owners, it
is stated as a general rule that a riparian owner is not precluded from acquiring land
by accretion or reliction, notwithstanding the fact that the accumulation is brought about
by partly artificial obstructions erected by third persons, where the riparian owner had no
part In erecting the artificial barrier. We think it is a sound rule, especially In view of the
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dealing with Kansas land went so far as to say that once alluvion
begins to form, a riparian owner may do what he thinks necessary
to make it firm or assure that it will not be eroded away 92 A dif-
ficulty on this issue may arise in Montana, North Dakota and South
Dakota where provisions from the old Field Code still exist. 98 In
those states the statutes in practically identical form provide that
"where from natural causes land forms by imperceptible degrees.
."9 it shall belong to the owner of the bank. Does the use of the
specific term "natural" imply that a different result is to be reached
if the accretion is caused by other than "natural" causes? It would
appear that Field who drafted the code knew what he was doing
when he used the term "natural causes" and intended to exclude
land forming from artificial causes. For one of the three sources
that he cites for this section was a New York case in which the
judge had said: "As the case stands, it is not necessary to pass
upon the question whether there is a distinction between the case
of alluvion formed by natural or artificial means. I find no such
distinction in the books. If, by some artificial structure or imped-
iment in the stream, the current should be made to impinge more
strongly against one bank, causing it imperceptibly to wear away,
and causing a corresponding accretion on the opposite bank, I am
not prepared to say that the riparian owner would not be entitled
to the alluvion thus formed, especially as against the party who
caused it."'15 The distinction between natural and artificial causes
is not made in the French Civil Code, the second of the three
authorities cited by Field, nor is it made in the third authority
cited.9 6 The existence in Montana of this statute, however, did not
prevent the Montana court from disposing of "made" land just as it
would have disposed of alluvon.97  It reasoned this way-
fact that we recognize that the riparian owner has a right which can only be taken from
him in accordance with established law* and if necessary that it be taken for public good,
upon due compensation." Solomon v. Sioux City, 243 Iowa 634, 51 N.W.2d 472, 476 (1952).
For Missouri law in accord see Whyte v. City of St. Louis, 153 Mo. 80, 54 S.W 478 (1899),
and Tatum v. City of St. Louis, 125 Mo. 647, 28 S.W 1002 (1894), cases involving the
Mississippi River, however. "The evidence shows that a significant factor in the develop-
ment of Omi Island and this land was the construction and channel work of the United
States Army Engineers attempting to control the channel of the river, divert It, and develop
a new channel across Cmi Island beginning about 1938. iT]his development work
finally resulted In the destruction of the western channel or high water chute and the
acceleration of accretion to both the west bank and the original Omi Island. The fact that
third parties performed construction work and accelerated these processes does not alter
the application of the rule as to ownership of accretion land." Krumnwiede v. Rose, 177 Neb.
570. 129 N.W.2d 491, 496 (1964). It should be noted that in Nebraska riparian owners own
to the center or thread of the stream.
92. State of Kansas v. Meriwether, 182 Fed. 457 (8th Cir. 1910).
93. See the article in this issue of the Review, by Professor Fisch.
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-05 (1960) (See Oberly v. Carpenter, 67 N.D. 495, 274 N.W
509, 511-12 (1937]) S.D. Code § 51.1104 (1939) MONT. PEv. CODES ANN. § 67-1302 (1947).
95. Halsey v. McCormick, 18 N.Y. 147, 150 (1858).
96. Frmmw, THE CIvIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORE 134-35. He cites "Code Napoleon,
Art 556, 557" and Emans v. Turnbull, 2 Johns., 313."
97. City of Missoula v. Bakke, 121 Mont. 534, 198 P.2d ,796 (1948) (Missoula River).
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In the case at bar the 'made' land can scarcely be regarded
as accretion since it was a deposit of land created by human
agency as distinguished from one created by natural
causes. However, the courts have sometimes applied the
rule relative to the ownership of accretions to the ownership
of 'made' land created by human agency We see no reason
why that rule should not be applied to the case at bar since
in principle there would seem to be no difference between
the ownership of 'made' land created by a city dump and
ownership of similar land created by water-borne deposits
resulting from natural causes. 8
This result is commended to the North Dakota and South Dakota
courts.
Now in determining whether applying the accretion doctrine to
such rapid changes as we have on the Missouri River is good or
bad today, or m determining how to apply it once the initial de-
cision to do so has been made, two questions seem of primary
importance to me. First, how important are the theories under-
lying the accretion doctrine today9 Perhaps the most can be said
in favor of the de mintmis and access to water rationales. But
with such a continual pattern of rapid change on the Missouri there
is little movement that is de minimis."9 At least historically, access
to the Missouri has been important;100 query well whether it is as
important today If it is as important today it probably is so for
a different reason. In the early history of the territories and states
on the Missouri it is clear that navigation was important both for
commercial and pleasure purposes.'' The significance of access for
purposes of individual irrigation and milling (power generating)
appears not to have been as great on the Missouri as on many
other streams in this country A primary importance of access
today, however, is for recreation such as fishing, and perhaps swim-
ming, or just to have a view Query how important use of the river
is as a watering place for cattle. A part of this change in im-
portance has come about with the assumption by government of
the tasks of providing water for irrigation and electrical power for
its many and varied purposes.
A second question to focus on, however, is: Who are in com-
petition for the ownership of this particular tract? Is a private
party competing with a private party or is a private party com-
98. Id. at 772.
99. Perhaps progress in stabilization will call for a change in this analysis.
100. See generally, VEsTAL, TuE Missousr (Bison Book ed. 1945).
101. Interestingly, the first case reported in the Dakota Territory Reports is an admiralty
case involving a libel against "the steamboat Cora for introducing into the Indian
country spirituous and intoxicating liquors." United States v. Steamboat Cora, 1 Dak. 1, 3
(1867).
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peting with the State? When the competition is, as it was in most
of the English cases,'10 2 between the State (King) and a private
party and a decision is given for the private party no other private
party is going to be harmed in order that the one might gain.
But where we have two private parties in competition, to the ex-
tent that one will gain land formerly owned by the other, much more
careful consideration should take place and some sort of equitable
balance should be reached. Since both are private parties one can-
not apply a simple presumption which favors a private party who
is contending with his government. And the courts should be care-
ful lest they apply cases that were decided on just such a pre-
sumption to facts where the presumption has no relevance. Gen-
erally this situation will occur in one of two basic fact situations.
First, riparian land may be submerged and later reappear on the
other side of the river The following illustration should be helpful:
N \.
"B" represents the original bed of the river. Tract "F" was the
riparian tract on the south bank and tract "CD" was the riparian
tract on the north bank. Gradually the river moved north washing
over all of tract "CD" until eventually the river came to its current
bed, "A" It has, therefore, bared tract "D" which used to be a
part of tract "CD" on the north. Tract "F" was and is still owned
by "X", and tract "CD" was owned by "Y" "Y" has not trans-
ferred any interest in tract "CD" Should the original owner of
tract "D", namely "Y", be able to reclaim it now that it has re-
appeared on the other side of the river or should it be treated as
accreting to tract "F" and its ownerlOS It seems to me that the
equities are fairly equal in the abstract and that one should pay
particular attention to the time element. If the time period for
submergence and reappearance was short, it seems to me fairer
to deny one property owner, "X", access to water than to deny
another property owner, "Y", all claim to what was once his land.
102. See Gifford v. Yarborough, 5 Bing. 163, 130 Eng. Rep. 1023 (1828).
103. For a case dealing with this question see Oberly v. Carpenter, 67 N.D. 495, 274
N.W. 509 (1937).
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However, if the process of submergence and reappearance consumes
many years it is reasonable to assume that one whose land has
been so submerged would not expect to regain it, and the newly
gained access to water will in all probability have taken on greater
importance for the other tract.
The second situation is our frontland-backland problem that we
started out with originally Here again it seems to me that the
solution should depend on a balancing of the equities, the primary
equity being how long has the frontland been submerged, or to put
it another way, how long has the backland been abutting on the
River9 A substantial period should justify awarding of alluvion to
the backland even though it covers an area where frontland used
to exist.
To return to the two specific cases posited at the beginning of
this article neither the Supreme Court of Iowa nor the Supreme
Court of North Dakota gave an entirely sound decision. I tend to be
more critical of the Iowa decision than of the North Dakota de-
cision, since the Iowa decision seems clearly wrong in result, where-
as the criticism of the North Dakota decision is primarily in its
formulation of the rule. To take 850 acres of land from "X" and give
it to "Y" because of ten year's activity of the Missouri, as the
Iowa court did, strikes my "sense of injustice," to borrow words
from Edmond Cahn. 0 4 Almost 45 years ago Henry Glassie proposed
legislation setting a "reasonable period" within which land could be
restored without title passing. 10 5 If it was not restored within that
period, title would pass when it was restored. This seems reasonable.
But even in the absence of such legislation it seems to me that
the courts could so interpret their rules on accretion as to give
some significance to the time element. The leading Missouri River
case rejecting the Iowa approach appeared to leave room for just
such flexibility-
Without holding that, in all cases where land has been
carried away or submerged by the action of the water in a
lake or river and afterward restored by the action of such
water, such land belongs to the original owner thereof, we
can see no reason, in justice or equity, why the land
involved in this case, after it had been restored by the river,
should be given to respondent merely because the river had
at some time touched her land. 06
There the two lots had been washed away between 1878 and 1888 and
104. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949).
105. Glassie, Restoration of the Former Front Estdte by Aluvoon, 10 VA. L. Rav. 106
(1923).
106. Allard v. Curran. 41 S.D. 73. 168 N.W. 761. 762 (1918). (Emphasis added).
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had been restored by 1900, that is a period of 22 years. Why should
title change? In the only other South Dakota case and one which
follows Allard the erosion began about 1900 and ended about 1912
when the river began to bare the land that it had covered. 0 The
baring took "about 10 years," for a total action time of 22 years.
Why should title change? However, the North Dakota Supreme
Court in choosing to follow the South Dakota decisions does not
appear to have noted this language of flexibility that seems to
recognize the possible relevance in a future case of the time factor,
nor does the North Dakota Court appear to have noted the relatively
rapid action in these cases. 08
Furthermore, in its 1959 decision the Supreme Court of Iowa
made no attempt to analyze what reasons lay behind the rule that
it was applying. It simply said: "Right or wrong, it is well estab-
lished that lands of a riparian owner are as subject to being lost
by the gradual process of erosion by the river as they are of being
added to by the process of accretion.'""" The court did quote from
an earlier Iowa case to the effect that frontland loses to backland
and cited two other Iowa cases as reaffirming that principle. The
earlier case that it quoted was Payne v Hall,"0 a 1921 case. It is
true that in that case the court held that frontland lost to back-
land; however, even there, although it was the first Iowa case so
deciding, the court did not examine into the reasons for the accretion
rule. It said simply- "It also appears to be the law that. ."'U
and then set forth the principle citing seven cases from other juris-
dictions, three of which have basically the same facts 1 2 and four
of which have distinguishable facts.1l8 But more important the
court referred to the earlier South Dakota case and cited it for
the proposition that "where lands are overflowed and submerged,
and within a reasonable time the waters retire and the land re-
appears, the title of the owner is not disturbed, and the proprietor-
ship remains in the original owner. 1" 4 Why was not this rule applied
in the 1959 case? Perhaps it was, perhaps the court meant to say
that a total of 10 years is not reappearance "within a reasonable
tune." And although the court in 1959 does not refer to "a reason-
able time," it does state an issue to be whether it had become the
bed of the river for a sufficiently long period of time "to wrest it
107. Erickson v. Horlyk, 48 S.D. 544, 205 N.W. 613 (1925).
108. See footnote 6 aupra, and the cases cited therein.
109. Wilcox v. Pinney, 250 Iowa 1378, 98 N.W.2d 720, 723 (1959).
110. 192 Iowa 780, 185 N.W 912 (1921).
111, Id. at 915 (Emphasis added).
112. See the cases discussed at notes 119, 126 and 132 infra.
113. See the cases discussed at notes 120-123 infra, and in note 126 infra.
114. 185 N.W. at 914. (Emphasis added).
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from vegetation and destroy its value for agricultural purposes." 115
In other words, is the court saying that "a reasonable time" is that
time which it takes to wrest land from vegetation? From the lan-
guage used, the court appears to be applying the productivity ap-
proach to the compensation theory The difficulty with saying that
this is intended to be the definition for "a reasonable tune" is that
it has come in through the back door so to speak. It was being
given as a definition of the term "high-water mark" which is where,
in Iowa, state ownership of the Missouri River bed begins.116 The
court went on to hold that the facts were sufficient to justify a
conclusion that the land involved had been wrested from vegetation.
The tine period involved in the 1921 case was not clearly determined;
it could have been as much as 75 years. In Rupp v Kirk"17 one of
the two other Iowa cases cited in 1959, some 400 acres were involved.
The erosion had begun in 1902 and had continued to 1927 when the
River began moving back to where it had come from. How long
this movement continued and how long it then took to build up the
400 acres is not clear. The suit was decided m 1942, so that a max-
imum period of forty years could have been involved. Again, the
court failed to analyze the reasons behind the rule, merely quoting
the rule from the Payne case. In the other of the two Iowa cases
cited, Solomon v Sioux City,"I8 while 300 feet of accreted land
formed within a three year period, it is not clear how long the
eroded property had been submerged. We know that it existed in
1856 and that it did not exist in 1932 when the accretive process
began. The court first rejected the argument that the law of ac-
cretion should not apply to the rapidly shifting Missouri, and went
on to hold that title had shifted to a new "high-water mark," never
even referring to the Payne case for the frontland-backland propo-
sition.
The Iowa court in its original 1921 formulation of the frontland-
backland rule did rely on some cases from other Missouri River
jurisdictions. It may be well to review those cases and what has
happened to them m their respective jurisdictions at this point.
Proceeding alphabetically with the jurisdictions, three of the cases
cited by the Iowa court in 1921 were Kansas cases. In the earliest of
these Kansas cases, Peuker v Canter,"9 the following happened:
115. 250 Iowa 1378, 98 N.W.2d at 723.
116. See the cases cited in note 156 infra.
117. 231 Iowa 1387, 4 N.W.2d 264 (1942).
118. 248 Iowa 634, 51 N.W.2d 472 (1952).
119. 62 Kan. 363, 63 Pee. 617 (1901).
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Illustration I Illustration II
In 1855 the land was as in Illustration I, apparently by 1876 the
River had shifted easterly as noted in Illustration II and back again
to its Illustration I position. Thus all the action took place within
a maximum period of 21 years. And some one hundred twenty
four acres were involved. The court held that plaintiff, who owned
tract "3", was entitled to alluvion when the water receded, even
though it extended over area which formerly belonged to tracts "1"
and "2."
A second Kansas case cited, Fowler v Wood,' 20 holds that bank
land was washed away by avulsion and that ownership was not
lost when it reappeared as an island. The land that was later bared
between the island and the mainland was awarded to the island even
though the island and the mainland ultimately connected. It is pos-
sible that there had been some land lost from the mainland bank
by erosion which is now gamed by the islanders through the ac-
cretive process, but the court does not make this clear On the
whole this case was indeed weak authority, if any authority at all,
for the Iowa rule. However it has been substantially bolstered by
two more recent Kansas cases. In Intfen v Hutson, 120a the Kansas
Supreme Court held that land lost by avulsion must reappear within
the original boundary lines to be reclaimed and that this require-
ment would not be satisfied by its reappearance as alluvion ac-
creting to an island which had first appeared outside those original
boundary lines. This was followed by the recent case of Grape v
Laiblen, 120b in which the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
riparian land owner had lost land through erosion which when it
reappeared appeared as alluvion attaching to an island that had
newly formed in the bed of the River but outside the original
boundary lines of the eroded land.
120. 73 Kan. 511, 85 Pac. 763 (1906).
120a. 145 Kan. 389, 65 P.2d 576 (1937).
120b. 181 Kan. 677, 314 P.2d 335 (1957).
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The third Kansas case cited is Wood v McAlpine. 1 There the
trial court's decision for the plaintiff based on a jury finding of
avulsion was reversed due to a failure of the trial judge to adequately
define avulsion and erosion to the jury The supreme court was
not disagreeing with the trial court's holding that if the land had
been lost by avulsion and subsequently reappeared it belonged to
the original owner and is not accretion to the bank owner The
implication was that if it had been lost by erosion it would go
to the bank owner as alluvion. Then there was the added com-
plication that it was the original lost land owner who had conveyed
the bank to the defendant. The only way that she could have re-
tained ownership of any part of the bed would have been if there
had been avulsion prior to her conveyance and title to that part of
the bed did not pass under the conveyance. So this case, too, seems
like very weak authority for the Iowa rule. Apparently there are
no subsequent Kansas cases on this issue.
Two Missouri cases were cited by the 1921 Iowa court in support
of its frontland-backland decision. In Naylor v Cox 122 the earlier
of these two cases, the Missouri court did hold that there was
accretion to an island even though it occurred on an area that once
belonged to the bank but which had been washed away Thus one
property owner does lose land to another property owner; however,
each owned originally riparian land so that the case is distinguish-
able from our current problem where the contest is between an
owner of originally riparian land and an owner of land that was not
originally riparian. Further, the court appears to have put in some
flexibility as far as the time element was concerned:
if, after the original survey in 1817, a part of said fractional
section 4 was washed away by the river, and the main channel
of the river covered the place where it originally stood
for any considerable length of time, and afterwards accre-
tions to the island began, and gradually grew and extended
north towards the north bank until they went beyond what
was originally the southern or river boundary of said section
4, said accretions thus formed to the island belonged to
the owner of the island, and not to the owner of the original
fractional section 4.123
On the other hand, perhaps the court was not doing anything
more than trying to distinguish avulsion. How long a time period
was involved is not clear The washing away occurred after the
1817 survey The court says that the river "for a while" encroached
121. 85 Kan. 657, 118 Pac. 1060 (1911).
122. 114 Mo. 232, 21 S.W 589 (1892).
123. Id. at 592. (Emphasis added).
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on the bank land. It began to recede about 1844, and the suit was
in 1892.124
The other Missouri case cited by the Iowa court was Widdecombe
v Chiles.125 There the river had completely washed away an 8.68
acre riparian tract and a large part of the half-section behind it in
a 27 year period, after which the river reversed directions and
moved the other way gradually baring the land it had earlier m-
undated until some 200 acres had been bared in a 43 year period.
The bared land included the original 8.68 acre tract. The court
clearly held that the 8.68 tract was lost forever to its original
owner and that the new alluvion belonged to what was formerly
the backland. This court did not attempt a study of the reasons
underlying the accretion doctrine either, contenting itself with a
substantial quote from a Connecticut case, including the reference
to "natural boundaries," set forth earlier in this article. 126
There is subsequent Missouri history for the rule. The Widde-
combe decision and rule was applied in 1925 where, again, the court
gave no consideration to the underlying reasons.1 2 7 It said simply-
"There are opposition authorities, but such is the Missouri rule.
' 1 28
As to the time element the court observed: "There was no dispute
that lot No. 2 had been swept away for years prior to 1895, when
the river first began to recede. ",129 And in 1927 the Missouri
court held that a tract which had been wholly washed away and
remade as an island became the property of the state.130 Accretion
added to it until it eventually joined the bank. The action took
place from the survey time in 1839 to perhaps as late as 1897 The
Widdecombe rule has been reaffirmed in dicta in Missouri as re-
cently as 1956.181
Since Montana does not have any cases on this problem, we can
pass to a consideration of the Nebraska cases. One Nebraska case
124. See Cox v. Arnold, 129 Mo. 337, 31 S.W 592 (1895), for later litigation Involving
the same land, but without any change in result. And for another Missouri case in accord
see Vogelsmeler v. Prendergast, 137 Mo. 271, 39 S.W 83 -(1897), where the court held
erroneous an instruction which gave newly bared land to the person who had owned the
area before the land washed away, since it had not formed as accretion to his remaining
part of the island. The cutting had begun in 1820 and had continued to about 1858 there-
after until 1875 some sand bars formed at which time there was an avulsive change which
bared the general area.
125. 173 Mo. 195, 73 S.W 444 (1903).
126. See the text at note 20 supra. The facts in the Connecticut case are also distinguish-
able. There both contesting parties were also owners of originally riparian land, and the
case did not involve land which was formerly nonripartan. Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292,
10 AtL 565 (1887).
127. Doebbeling v. Hall, 310 Mo. 204, 274 S.W. 1049 (1925).
128. Id. at 1054.
129. Id. at 1055.
130. Hecker v. Bleish, 319 Mo. 149, 3 S.W.2d 1008 (1927). In connection with this case
see the discussion at note 102 8uLra.
131. Erickson v. Greub, 287 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1956.
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was cited in 1921 by the Iowa court. That was Yearsley v Gipple.182
There defendant's grantor had conveyed to the plaintiff's grantor a
tract using a limited boundaries description, thus retaining some
alluvion that had formed previously This alluvion later washed
away and plaintiff's land became riparian. The court held that when
accretion added to the bank, the alluvion belonged to the plaintiff
and not to the defendant even though it had formed where the
alluvion formerly lost by defendant's grantor had been. Apparently
the earlier alluvion had washed away during a three-month period,
September through November of 1912. The case was decided in
1919 so that a maximum of seven years was involved. The court
quoted language to the effect that every land owner bounded by
water is subject to loss, so he should receive the gain. Later Mis-
souri cases reaffirm Yearsley In Wiltse v Bolton,"3 the Nebraska
court achieved what was probably a correct result for that case,
but it made some statements that seem clearly wrong. There the
1856 government survey showed some riparian land which had been
lost by avulsion before the patent to the then riparian land was
given. It could reasonably be argued that the patentees were not
on notice as to the avulsion and should take from the government
as if no avulsion had occurred. The land that had been lost by
avulsion continued as a part of the bed until at least 1908, the
patentees having acquired their patent in 1897 The court, how-
ever, said: "If the Pfeiffer tract had been homesteaded before it
was taken by the river, the private owner would have lost his title
by such action of the river, and even though at a later date the
river receded and the boundaries of the land could again be es-
tablished, it would not go to the former owner "134 The court cited
only Yearsley But Yearlsey dealt with erosion and accretion, not
avulsion. Title should not be lost when avulsion occurs, so that the
court's statement in Wiltse seems clearly wrong. The Nebraska rule
has, however, been applied in a case as recently as 1958. Then,
after considerable discussion of the evidence, the court concluded:
"We can come to no other conclusion than that at some time after
1879, and before 1923, the west or right-hand bank of the Mssouri
River crossed over onto appellant's lands and then, in moving back
to the east, left the high bank. Thus the Woods 80 and the
north 600 feet of the Jones 40 became riparian lands and the owners
thereof, and their successors in title, became entitled to all lands
joining thereon to the east by either accretion or reliction."1 85 And
132. 104 Neb. 88, 176 N.W 641 (1919).
138. 132 Neb. 354, 272 N.W 197 (1937).
134. Id. at 199.
136. Worm v. Crowell, 165 Neb. 718, 87 N.W.2d 384, 398-94 (1958).
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they got it except for what had been lost by adverse possession. 3 6
The North and South Dakota cases have had to deal with sta-
tutes,137 essentially identical in each state. Although Montana does
not have any cases dealing with this problem, it does have a sim-
ilar statute. 33 The North Dakota statute follows:
Where from natural causes land forms by imperceptible
degrees upon the bank of a river or stream, navigable or
not navigable, either by accumulation of material or by
the recession of the stream, such land belongs to the owner
of the bank, subject to any existing right of way over the
bank.
13 9
In 1937 in Oberly v Carpenter,1 40 the North Dakota Supreme Court
applied this statute to the situation where land which had been
originally riparian on one side of the river had been washed over
until it reappeared on the other side of the river 141 The court held
that the land in question now belonged not to its original owner, but to
the riparian owner on that side of the river where it was reappear-
ing. In Oberly the movement consisted of as much as 240 rods m
38 years. During the course of its opinion the court made a state-
ment which it backtracked on later It said: "the law governing
riparian rights has no regard for artificial boundary lines, whether
between sections or their subdivisions, or between counties, states,
or nations.' 14 2 In 1955 in Hogue v Bourgozs,143 the Supreme Court
of North Dakota held that mainland which had been washed away
by erosion, but which reappeared first as a sand bar and then as
an island, did not return to its original ownership but became
property of the state. Here again there was a statute which seem-
ingly answered the question of ownership: "Islands and accumula-
tions of land formed in the beds of streams which are navigable
belong to the state, if there is no title or prescription to the con-
136. For additional Missouri River accretion cases involving adverse possession argu-
ments see Wilcox v. Pinney, 250 Iowa 1378, 98 N.W.2d 720 (1959) Arnd v. Harrington,
227 Iowa 43, 287 N.W 292 (1939) Kirschman v. Cochran, 241 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1951)
Cullen v. Johnson, 325 Mo. 253, 29 S.W 39 (1930) Woodland v. Woodland, 147 N.W.2d
590 (N.D. 1966). And as the court Pointed out in Peterson v. Harpst, 247 S.W.2d 663, 668
(Mo. 1952), accretion will follow adverse possession of the mainland (here an island)
" 'even though the deposit had been made but a year or a day.' " To the same effect,
see Burket v. Krimlofski, 167 Neb. 45, 91 N.W.2d (1958) (also an island).
137. N.D.CENT. CODE § 47-06-05 (1960) , S.D. CODE § 51.1104 (1939). However, the South
Dakota statute has been altered substantially since the South Dakota cases by the addition
of several sections. These, however, deal with surveying and setting of boundaries and do
not appear to affect basic principles substantially. See the discussion at note 163, infra and
the sections cited in the note.
138. MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 67-1302 (1947).
139. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-05 (1960).
140. 67 N.D. 495, 274 N.W 509 (1937).
141. See the general discussion of this problem supra at note 108.
142. 67 N.D. 495, 274 N.W. at 513.
143. 71 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1955).
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trary "14 Arguably, something could have been made out of the
"if" clause m the statute had the court not wanted to favor the state.
Apparently all of the action took place between 1904 and 1942 or a
period of 38 years. At one point the court observed: "The erosion
of the mainland proceeded eastward at a rate of about twenty to
forty rods per year until about 1922 at which time the east channel
reached its farthermost limits. In this process patented lands claimed
by defendants were totally destroyed.' ' 4 5 Then in 1965 the North
Dakota Supreme Court decided Perry v Erling14 6 the case discussed
at the beginning of this article. The court distinguished away the
first statute noted in this paragraph on the basis that it applied
only to the original riparian bank, that is the bank that was riparian
at the time of the government survey
In Perry the court was not dealing with an "originally" riparian
bank, but one which had become so only by action of the river
itself. This distinction had already been drawn by the South Da-
kota Supreme Court.1"7 Interestingly, however, this was not done
until the second of the two South Dakota cases dealing with this
question. The court in the first case had not even referred to the
statute 48 Perhaps it had not been aware of its existence. In Gree-
man v Smith,4 9 where the North Dakota Supreme Court followed
Perry, apparently the erosion took place sometime between 1899 and
1933 and thereafter the same land was built up again. In 1966 the
Supreme Court of North Dakota again reaffirmed the Perry rule,
without special consideration of the time element involved."50
What conclusions can be drawn from this series of Missouri
River cases where one private party is vying with another private
party for land at one time clearly owned by one of them. First,
while it would appear that many of the early cases on the subject
were importing an element of flexibility through a time period con-
sideration, this appears to have been lost in the shuffle, and lost
even though there are at most only 23 relevant cases. Thus back-
land which comes to abut on the river either will or will not
achieve full riparian status depending upon whether it takes place
m Iowa, Kansas, Missouri or Nebraska for the former, or whether
it takes place m North Dakota or South Dakota for the latter
144. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-08 (1960). For a similar South Dakota statute see S.D.
CODE § 51.1107 (1939), and a similar Montana Statute see MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 67-1304
(1947).
145. 71 N.W.2d at 50.
146. 132 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1965). Further comments on this case may be found in Beck,
Boundary Litigation and Legislation sn North Dakota, 41 N.D. L. REV. 424, 446-50 (1965).
147. Erickson v. Horlyk, 48 S.D. 544, 205 N.W 613 (1925).
148. See Allard v. Curran, 41 S.D. 73, 168 N.W. 761 (1918).
149. 138 N.W.2d 433 (N.D. 1965).
150. Woodland v. Woodland, 147 N.W.2d 590 (N.D. 1966).
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Montana remains without decision on the issue. Second, most of the
cases totally failed to examine any of the reasons underlying the
accretion rules, and those that did examine any of the reasons, did
not even come close to doing a thorough job of it. No case examined
all of the underlying reasons. Third, there may have been some con-
fusion in North Dakota and South Dakota over the "agri limitati"
concept.
[T]he Roman agrL limitatt . consisted, generally, of
districts or territories acquired by conquest, and assigned
and set apart for the benefit of veteran soldiers when re-
tired from active service in the army The method of survey-
ing such a territory was to draw lines towards the four
quarters of the heavens, parallel and crosswise, in order to
effect a uniform division of the lots, and to fix immutable
boundaries between them. These boundaries, called limites,
were marked by a slip of land left for the purpose untouched
by cultivation, as balks or highways. The squares of land
contained either thirty-three or a hundred and thirty-three
acres; that is, they were either ten or twenty actus square.
Lands thus surveyed and appropriated were called limited
lands - agri limitatL - and when they bordered on streams
or other waters they were not entitled, as other riparian
lands were, to any accretion or alluvion, or to islands in
the stream, but were strictly confined to the lines by which
they were actually or theoretically limited.'
5
1
It would be easy to assume that this should apply to federal govern-
ment set boundary lines. But after giving the foregoing description
and definition of agri limitati, the United States Supreme Court
expressly rejected its applicability in the common law- "This method
of disposing of the subject might be convenient and attended with
some advantages if it were sanctioned by the law; but we do not
see any greater reason for adopting this departure from the common
law than that followed in the case of State of Indiana v Milk. ,,152
Now, of course, one whose boundary does not reach the water,
whether because of intervening land or because the conveyance to
him set his boundary to run along the bank, is not a riparian owner
and therefore has no riparian rights, but this does not depend
upon government set boundary lines. Thus, observes one court,
where the "call in the deed is for a boundary short of the river,
for example, to a street or to a wharf line, the grant is not to the
river, and the land granted is not riparian."'15 In many cases courts
have considered just such a question: does the boundary line reach
151. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 399 (1891).
152. Ibid.
153. Widdecombe v. Chiles, 173 Mo. 195, 78 S.W. 444, 446 (1908).
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the river or does it stop at some earlier point such as a meander
line?'15  This non-riparian land will continue without riparian rights
as long as the water is not the boundary Undoubtedly no one will
quarrel with these conclusions. However, this does not mean that
the land subsequently cannot or should not become fully riparian.
Another problem on the Missouri has arisen from the fact that
in six of the seven states abutting thereon, the state owns at
least part of the bed. In four the state owns to the low-water mark,' 5
and in two the state owns to the high-water mark.1 50 Only in Nebraska
does the riparian owner own to the thread or center of the stream.157
The problem in these six states has been whether or not what is now
dry land appeared first as an island and then had alluvion added
to it m which case it would belong to the state or whether it formed
as alluvion to the bank from the beginning in which case it would
belong to the bank owner. Numerous cases deal with this question,
including extensive discussion of what is an island and how one is
formed.158 A related problem is that of whether or not the island
154. See, e.g., Stratbucker v. Junge, 153 Neb. 885, 46 N.W.2d 486 (1951) , Harrison v.
Stipes, 34 Neb. 431, 51 N.W. 976 (1892) , Lammers v. Nissen, 4 Neb. 245 (1876).
155. Missours. Doebbeling v. Hall, 310 Mo. 204, 274 S.W 1049 (1925) , Moore v. Farmer,
156 Mo. 33, 56 S.W 493 (1900).
Montana. Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 Pac. 328 (1925), Gibson v. Kelly,
15 Mont. 417, 39 Pac. 517 (1895). MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 67-712 "Except where the
grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the land,
when it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream
at low-water inark " (Emphasis added).
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (1960)contains language almost identical
with the Montana statutory language quoted above. Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47 (N.D.
1955) State v. Loy, 74 N.D. 182, 20 N.W.2d 668 (1945) Oberly v. Carpenter, 67 N.D.
495, 274 N.W 509 (1937) Gardner v. Green, 67 N.D. 268, 271 N.W 775 (1937).
South Dakota S.D. CODE § 51.0703 (1939) contains language almost identical with
the Montana statutory language quoted above. See Parsons v. City of Sioux Falls, 65 S.D.
145, 272 N.W 288 (1937), dealing with the Big Sioux River.
156. Iowa Payne v. Hall, 192 Iowa 780, 185 N.W 912, 914 (1921), 
" 
'High-water mark'
has a definite meaming in our law. It is coordinate with the limit of the bed of the water,
and that, only, is to be considered the bed which the water occupies sufficiently long and
continuously to wrest it from vegetation, and destroy its Yalue for agricultural purposes."
Wilcox v. Pinney, 250 Iowa 1378, 98 N.W.2d 720, 723 (1959).
Kansas See Green v. Ector, 187 Kan. 240, 356 P.2d 664 (1960).
157. The Supreme Court of Nebraska went through a tortuous process arriving at this
result. It probably was not definitely settled until 1906. In Kinkead v. Turgeon, 74 Neb.
573, 104 N.W 1061 (1905), the Court had held that title to the beds of waters navigable
in fact is in the state and "that the right of the riparian owner Is bound by the banks of
the stream." Id. at 1064. This opinion was vacated on rehearing in 1906, Kinkead v. Tur-
geon, 74 Neb. 580, 109 N.W 744 (1906). There the court applied the common law test of
navigability which is whether or not the river is affected by the "flow of the tide." Since
the Missouri Is not affected by the flow of the tide, it is not navigable, and riparian own-
ers own to the center or thread of nonnavigable streams. For recent affirmation see
Krumwiede v. Rose, 177 Neb. 570, 129 N.W.2d 491, 496 (1964).
158. For holdings that an island belonging to the state had formed rather than ac-
cretion to the mainland see Tyson v. State, 283 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1960) (Iowa) State v.
Raymond, 254 Iowa 828, 119 N.W.2d 135 (1963), East Omaha Land Co. v. Hansen, 117
Iowa 96, 90 N.W 705 (1902), Holman v. Hodges, 112 Iowa 714, 84 N.W 950 (1901)
Hecker v. Bleish, 319 Mo. 149, 3 S.W.2d 1008 (1927), Bleish v. Rhodes, 242 S.W 971 (Mo.
1922) ("The evidence is in striking conflict.") Frank v. Goddin, 193 Mo. 390, 91 S.W
1057 (1906) Moore v. Farmer, 156 Mo. 33, 56 S.W 493 (1900), Hogue v. Bourgols, 71
N.W2d 47 (N.D. 1955), jState v. Loy, 74 N.D. 182, 20 N.W.2d 668 (1945). For holdings
that there was accretion to the mainland rather than the formation of an island see State
of Iowa v. Carr, 191 Fed. 257 (8th Cir. 1911) (Iowa) , State of Kansas v. Merlwether, 182
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existed at the time of the government survey and therefore whether
or not it passed from the government with the original conveyance.'59
Now if alluvion is added to the island until ultimately the island
joins with the bank, the access of the riparian bank owner to the
water has been cut off. 160 This is not a problem in Nebraska unless
Fed. 457 (8th Cir. 1910) (Kansas) Payne v. Hall, 192 Iowa 780, 185 N.W 912 (1921),
Green Iv. Ector, 187 Kan. 240, 356 P.2d 664 (1960) , Stark v. Meriwether, 98 Kan. 10, 157
Pac. 438 (1916), aff'd on rehearing, 99 Kan. 650, 163 Pac. 152 (1917), Cullen v. Johnson,
325 Mo. 253, 29 S.W.2d 39 (1930) Dumm v. Cole County, 315 Mo. 568, 287 S.W 445 (1926),
Chinn v. Naylor, 182 Mo. 583, 81 S.W 1109 (1904) Minton v. Steele, 125 Mo. 181, 28 S.W
746 (1894).
The following are various descriptions that have been given when deciding whether
or not an island has been formed. "The general characteristics of the 'Iowa chute, coupled
with the testimony of witnesses in connection with this matter, bring us to the conclusion
that there was no well-defined island, within the proper meaning of that term, that existed
in the river bed and which was separated from the mainland by a definite body of water
of the Missouri river flowing continually therein. Unquestionably the river has more or
less frequently, especially in times of high water, flowed over these accreted lands down
the 'Iowa chute' This would account for the condition of the vegetation in the 'chute' and
for the preservation of a more or less well-defined depression. The fact that water from
the river may occasionally and periodically flow entirely around a portion of land does
not necessarily make it an island." Payne v. Hall, 192 Iowa 780, 185 N.W 912, 917 (1921).
"Islands that arise from the beds of streams usually first present themselves as bars
Before it will support vegetation of any kind a bar may become valuable for fishing,
for hunting, as a shooting park, for the harvest of ice, for pumping sand, and for many
other well-recognized objects of human interest and industry. If further deposits of alluvion
upon Its borders would make it more valuable, no reason is apparent why the law of ac-
cretion should not apply. It is not before the court to say what primitive formation will
carry the right to accretions, but the ability to support crops certainly is not the single
test." Fowler v. Wood, 73 Kan. 511, 85 Pac. 763, 777 (1906). "The size and location of the
trees is consistent with topography shown by the survey made by the Chief of Engineers
U. S. Army in 1891. This survey shows both the island and an accretion to the west bank
of the river. It shows that the vegetation is heaviest near western side of the island, but
that this vegetation does not extend to the island's western shore. It also shows little or
no vegetation upon the accretion to the west bank of the river. -If, as is probable, the land
bearing the heaviest growth was formed first, the bar in the river was formed before the
accretion to the bank or in other words it was formed as an island. Other topographical
features shown by this survey, such as the size and the shape of the island, the direction
of the flow of the Knife River, the location of the mouth of the Knife River and the angle
at which it enters the Missouri all attest to the probability of the truth of the testimony
of plaintiff's witness. We therefore affirm the trial court's finding that the land in question
was formed as an island and by the accretion thereto." State v. Loy, 74 N.D. 182, 20
N.W.2d 668, 670 (1945).
A still different result occurred in McFerrin v. Wiltse, 210 Iowa 627, 231 N.W 438
(1930), where the court held that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff "to show that
the land was formed slowly, gradually, and imperceptibly to the shoreline as the water
in the river receded." Id. at 439. The court then concluded. "[T]he evidence does not dis-
close whether the tract was formed by slow, gradual, and imperceptible additions to lot
one, or whether it began as sand bars attached only to the river bed." Ibid. So plaintiff
had failed to meet his burden of proof. For reversals due to erroneous instructions see
Hahn v. Dawson, 134 Mo. 581, 36 S.W. 233 (1896), and Perkins v. Adams, 132 Mo. 131, 03
S.W 778 (1896).
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that once there has been accretion, should a
creek cut through a part of the accreted land, it would still be treated as accretion. Miller
v. Lloyd, 257 Mo. 35, 204 S.W 257 (1918). It may be a difficult question as to what hap-
pens first. For a similar case with a slough arising after accretion see Curry v. Crull, 342
Mo. 553, 116 S.W.2d 125 (1938). See also, Minton v. Steele, 125 Mo. 181, 28 S.W 746 (1894)
Dartmouth College v. Rose, 172 Neb. 764, 112 N.W.2d 256 (1961) Independent Stock Farm
v. Stevens, 128 Neb. 619, 159 N.W 647 (1935).
159. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Hoover, 86 Iowa 736, 52 N.W 124 (1892), Smith v. Miller,
105 Iowa 688, 70 N.W 123 (1897) (not an island, but land between the meander line and
the actual water boundary).
160. On dividing accretion as between the mainland and an island see Widdicombe v.
Rosemiller, 118 Fed. 295 (W.D. Mo. 1902) Bigelow v. Hoover, 86 Iowa 736, 52 N.W 124
(1892), Roll v. Martin, 164 Neb. 133, 82 N.W.2d 34 (1957) (equitable estoppel applied)
Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47, 55 (N.D. 1955).
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the island begins on the other side of the center or thread of the
stream and would not have been so in the other states either had
they adopted the common law navigability test as Nebraska did and
held that riparian owners own the bed of the River to the center or
thread thereof. On the other hand, there is something to be said
today for public ownership of islands that arise from accretion, since
the amount of good recreation land is on a constant decrease. Any-
way, it is probably too late for the six other states to change.
As pointed out earlier, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota
have statutes m point: "Islands and accumulations of land formed
in the beds of streams which are navigable belong to the state, if
there is no title or prescription to the contrary "161
A fourth situation where some equitable balancing is needed is
where alluvion begins to form on a particular bank and then con-
tinues forming laterally in front of other riparian land although
never attaching thereto, or attaching thereto only after working to-
ward shore from the original point of formation. It seems to me
eminently fair to ignore the angle of formation and apportion some
alluvion to the latter riparian owner so that he may maintain his
access to the stream. 162
CONCLUSIONS
1. The seven states abutting on the Missouri River have fairly
generally agreed that the common law test of navigability should be
rejected in favor of a "navigable in fact" test. The only exception
to this is Nebraska. These same seven have, on the other hand,
uniformly accepted the common law doctrine of accretion with the
recognition that perhaps it occurs a little faster on the Missouri than
on other bodies of water With reference to the latter feature, Mon-
tana would appear to be an exception. Further there is a limited
exception for North Dakota and South Dakota with respect to the
frontland-backland situation.
2. Generally the accretion doctrine should be applied to the
161. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-08 (1960). See Hogue v. Bourgols, 71 N.W.2d 47, 52 (N.D.
1955). See note 144 supra.
162. See Crandall v. Allen, 118 Mo. 403, 24 S.W 172 (1893). Of course it should not be
overlooked that "it is, at best, in most instances a difficult matter to determine the precise
point at which the increase started, or the exact course that it followed." McCoy v. Paxton,
156 Iowa 194, 135 N.W 1091,1092 (1912), where the question was. did it accrete to section
16 or to section 17" And the parties are free to agree upon where their boundary line shall
be., "[A]n oral agreement, fixing a division line, where possession is taken under the con-
tract with the knowledge of the other party is valid and final, regardless of the question
of time." Id. at 1093. This would fall within the scope of what Is generally referred to as
the "practical location of boundaries." For a discussion of this subject as it relates to North
Dakota law see Beck, Boundary Litigation and Legislation in North Dakota, 41 N.D. L.
REv. 424, 463-70 (1965). See also the following cases Haynie v. May, 217 Iowa 1233, 252
N.W 749 (1934) Jennings v. Shipp, 115 N.W.2d 12, 17 (N.D. 1962).
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Missouri River when the contest involves a private party versus
the state, and the presumption should be in favor of accretion as
contrasted with avulsion.
3. Generally when the dispute involves one private party versus
another the accretion doctrine should still be applied, but the time
element should be a primary consideration. The time element, how-
ever, appears to have been rejected in all seven jurisdictions, al-
although query Montana.
4. There should be no necessity for legislation to import the
time element consideration into the picture, although that might be
the best route to follow At the same time it might be well to re-
quire that a riparian owner take specified action within a certain
time, such as surveying and recordation, if he intends to claim
the alluvion in question.163 The state has a legitimate interest in
getting title questions settled speedily, especially with the continu-
ing trend of more and more people and less and less available land,
particularly recreation land.
5. One nagging problem that remains concerns the effect of
privately created boundary lines. It seems to me that the time
element consideration should apply to these lines also; there is no
magic in government boundary lines as long as private ones can
be identified.
163. Cf. S.D. COD §§ 51.1104-1 tihQugh §§ 51.1104-3 (SuPP. 1950).
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